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 Appellant, Melinda Watson, appeals a final order issued by the Second 
Judicial District Court, which dismissed a protective order issued by the 
Commissioner.  Melinda should prevail because the judge misapplied Civil Rule 
108 and she was denied a fair hearing. 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD 
I. Whether the judge erred in allowing a videotape and new emails to be 
introduced during the second part of an evidentiary hearing (which 
occurred thirty days after the first evidentiary hearing), when the 
evidence was never given to the other party prior to the second 
hearing, and the offering party had not moved to introduce the 
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evidence prior to the second hearing.   The standard of review for a 
question of law is de novo.  Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 
121, 63 P.3d 80.  Melinda preserved this objection by citing to Rule 
108 and indicating that these surprise exhibits violated the rule and 
due process.  R. 160-61, R. 556, l. 17-24, R. 557, l. 14-25, R. 558, l. 
1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25.   
II. Assuming the wrongful evidence is excluded, whether the protective 
order should be reinstated?   The proper interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law, and the review is for correctness.  Baird v. Baird, 
2014 UT 2008, 322 P.3d 728, 733.  The issue was preserved because 
the Court considered and ruled on the statutory requirements for 
stalking.  R. 581, l. 21-25; R. 582, l. 1-10. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 1.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The District Court granted Melinda’s petition for an ex-parte protective 
order on November 15, 2018.  After a hearing held on December 5, 2018, before 
Commissioner Morgan, he entered a detailed, written, recommended ruling and 
entered the protective order on December 17, 2018.  Michael filed an untimely 
appeal on December 31, 2018.  Utah Code § 78B-7-107(f).  Preliminarily, the 
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judge ruled as a policy matter that whether Michael had filed an objection in a 
timely manner was inconsequential because (to the effect) judges are supposed to 
try cases.  R. 150.  The evidentiary hearing proceeded, and Judge Edwards 
conducted it on two days rather than one due to Michael’s lawyer showing up very 
late on the day of the first hearing.  Michael’s lawyer had scheduled two matters 
on the same day and could not arrive at the time appointed by Judge Edwards in 
this matter.  The first day of the evidentiary hearing was held on February 28, 
2019.   There was only enough time for Melinda to present her evidence.  Thirty 
days later at a second evidentiary hearing held on March 28, 2019, Michael 
presented his evidence.  However, without moving to introduce new evidence, 
Michael introduced evidence of a videotape, a text, and emails, which had never 
been presented to the Commissioner, nor ever served on Melinda’s counsel.  Over 
Melinda’s objection, the undisclosed evidence was the dispositive evidence in the 
judge’s decision to dismiss the protective order.  R. 585, l. 21-25; R. 586, l. 1-21. 
 2.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
  A.  TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 
 Melinda was involved in a car accident, was severely injured, suffered 
traumatic brain injury, wears wrist braces, and has been advised not to lift objects 
over five pounds.  R. 158, l. 11-16; R. 159, l. 21-25, R. 160, l. 1-7.  Due to her 
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injury, Melinda is unable to defend herself by hitting someone back, pushing 
someone away, or removing someone’s arms from her presence.  R. 159, l. 18-19; 
R. 160, l. 12 - R. 162, l. 3-8.  In a special master’s order, he ordered the parties to 
remain in their residences during transfers, and Michael failed to do so.  R. 165, l. 
15-23.  In fact on one occasion, Michael left his residence, videotaped Melinda, 
and walked a few feet away from her vehicle.  R. 167, l. 16-21.  Melinda was 
frightened.  R. 167, l. 24.  Michael’s body language was menacing.  R. 167, l. 24-
25; R. 168, l. 1-6.  Melinda had the parties’ 16-year-old daughter with her in her 
vehicle.  R. 168, l. 14-18.  On other occasions during exchanges, Michael would 
record or photograph Melinda and/or the children.  R. 155-56; R. 169, l. 1-6.  
Michael also blocked the driveway preventing Melinda from leaving repeatedly 
during exchanges.  R. 169, l. 13; R. 191, l. 16-25; R. 192, l. 1-7.  Michael also 
would follow Melinda around a soccer field where she was coaching and 
photograph her and interrogate her.   R. 169, l. 21-25, R. 170, l. 1-2.  Other parents 
at the soccer practice would approach Melinda to check on her safety, and she felt 
frightened.  R. 171, l. 15-20.  These stalking episodes would last between 10 - 15 
minutes.  R. 171, l. 23, Ex. 2.  Michael also would attend her ten-year old son’s 
soccer games and approach and record Melinda.  R. 172, l. 15-17.  Melinda was 
frightened because Michael would yell at her, record her, and accuse her of 
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stealing things.  R. 173, l. 5-13.  Melinda had told Michael to stop stalking her 
about 6-12 times, but he ignored her requests.  R. 174, l. 24-25, R. 175, l. 1-2.  
Melinda told Michael that his behaviors frightened her.  R. 175, l. 9.  The divorce 
decree also contained a restraining order for the parties not to harass each other.  
R. 176, l. 1-2.  Melinda testified that Michael had placed her in fear previously 
when he slammed his fists on her vehicle’s roof.  Melinda called the police and 
presented a police report as evidence to corroborate her statement.  R. 178, l. 12-
25; R. 179, l. 1-15.  Melinda argued that because the police report had been 
presented to the Commissioner and not objected to, the Court could take judicial 
notice of it.  R. 180, l. 3-9.  The judge denied consideration of any police report 
that had been presented to the Commissioner.  R. 1180, l. 18.  Michael had also 
assaulted Melinda by shoving her so forcefully that she fell backwards.  R. 182, l. 
5-12.  Michael had also screamed at her, called her a “fucking bitch,” punched 
objects close to her, screamed at and frightened the parties’ teen-aged daughter.  
R. 184. l. 11-25, p. 54-55.  On another occasion when Melinda merely greeted the 
parties’ young son at an event and gave him a hug, Michael called the police and 
shoved her.  R. 157, l. 24-25, R. 188-89, l. 1-8.  A police report had been presented 
to the Commissioner and Melinda used it to cross-examine Michael.  However, the 
Court would not allow the report substantively.  At a children’s extracurricular 
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activity Michael approached Melinda in a threatening manner to the point where 
she hid from him in a closet.  R. 190, l. 10-25, R. 191, l. 1-15.  A police report was 
also used in the manner specified.  Michael also participated in voyeurism by 
taking photos of women’s butts, photographing Melinda naked (without her 
consent), and then downloading Melinda’s photo to his computer.  R. 194, l. 3-25, 
R. 195-97, R. 198, l. 1-12.   
 During cross-examination, Melinda was asked why she had not sought a 
protective order earlier.  Melinda testified that she had consulted with a victim’s 
advocate earlier.  However, she was not certain as to whether she could have 
obtained a protective order because she did not have a bruise.  R. 206, l. 14-25, p. 
R. 207, l. 1-2.  Michael’s attorney hypothesized, over Melinda’s counsel’s 
objection as to relevance and Utah R. Evid. 404(b), that Melinda was seeking a 
protective order in retaliation for sanctions that had been imposed upon her earlier 
by retired Judge Allphin (when Melinda had been represented by counsel through 
the Utah State Bar’s Modest Means program, who had no prior family law 
experience).  R. 209,  l. 3-13; R. 210-15, l. 1-5.  Melinda filed her request for a 
protective order approximately two months after Michael had filed his petition to 
modify the divorce decree.  R. 210, l. 21-25.  Melinda testified that she 
participates in a Tai-Chi class with other women.  R. 216, l. 23-25, R. 217, l. 1-2.  
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Melinda testified that she participated in the jogging portion of her children’s 
Taekwondo class.  R. 217, R. 219, l. 22.  Both parties did not honor the special 
master’s directive to exchange the children from their residences on occasion.  R. 
219, l. 14-19.  Melinda testified that she was frightened when Michael videotaped 
her when he left his residence and approached her vehicle due to Michael’s history 
of domestic violence, because of her vulnerable physical condition, and because 
he had struck her car violently before.  R. 223, l. 22-25; R. 225, l. 19-25; R. 229, l. 
17-22; R. 230, l. 1-10, 17-21.  She also testified that Michael became so angry 
after his military deployment overseas that he would shake with anger, that he was 
on medication, and that he had been diagnosed with anxiety.  R. 224, l. 1-7.  
Michael’s counsel asked Melinda whether Michael had asked Melinda to violate 
the special master’s directive by doing child exchanges at a location other than the 
parties’ residences.  R. 231, l. 14-25.  She responded that she did so because 
Michael refused to meet at the parties’ residences.  R. 231, l. 16.  Opposing 
counsel speculated that Melinda was feigning to look confused during his cross-
examination.  R. 239, l. 10-11.  Melinda testified that the parties’ 16-year-old 
daughter is also frightened of Michael.  R. 240, l. 11; p. 110, l. 1.  Melinda honked 
her horn for Michael to answer the door during the exchange at his residence 
because it was cold outside, and her 16-year-old daughter did not have a coat on.  
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R. 241, l. 4-7.  She testified that after Michael began videotaping her, her daughter 
videotaped Michael while as a passenger in Melinda’s vehicle.  R. 242, l. 13-14.  
Melinda testified that Michael’s videotaping of her in her vehicle was “creepy as 
hell.”  R. 243, l. 9.  Michael was chasing Melinda around the soccer field during 
his parent-time.  R. 245, l. 4-7.  Michael was yelling at Melinda and 
photographing her during the chasing time.  R. 245, l. 24-25.  The divorce decree 
allows the parties to be together at the children’s extracurricular activities and to 
be supportive of them.  R. 248, l. 11-19.  Michael is a six-foot man, and Melinda 
was terrified when he stalked her at the soccer practices because he was yelling at 
her and recording her while she was trying to coach young girls.  R. 248, l. 22-25, 
p. 118, l. 1-4.  On one occasion with the soccer team, Melinda had to call the 
police because Michael was following her around and the parents were all staring.  
R. 249, l. 7-12.  Michael never attended the children’s activities unless they were 
scheduled during his parent-time.  R. 249, l. 21-23.  The special master’s order 
required the parties to communicate during exchanges by text or email.  R. 253-54.  
Melinda provided consistent testimony about Michael’s blocking of her vehicle.  
R. 258-59. 
 During redirect examination, Melinda testified as follows.  Melinda’s first 
attorney was hired through the Utah State Bar’s modest means program.  R. 261, l. 
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19-25; p. 131.  This attorney: (1) admitted to Melinda during the evidentiary 
hearing before Judge Allphin that he did not know what he was doing; (R. 262, l. 
4-8);  (2) despite Melinda relating to her attorney that she was being stalked, he 
never advised her of her right to obtain a protective order (R. 261, l. 21-25, p. 131, 
l. 1-3); and, (3) told Melinda that he did not realize the hearing before Judge 
Allphin was an evidentiary hearing (R. 262, l. 17-18).  It was her attorney’s first 
family law case, and family law was not his field of practice.  R. 262, l. 25, p. 132, 
l. 2-3. Melinda’s modest means attorney offered limited evidence during the 
hearing.  R. 263, l. 4.  Judge Allphin never made a ruling on the issuance of a 
protective order.  R. 262, l. 9-13.  Melinda did not file a protective order because 
the police “brushed her off” when she asked about, and the victim’s advocate 
advised that without marks on her body, she could lose and inflame the abuser.  R. 
263, l. 13-19.  The first time Melinda met with Mr. Weckel, he advised her that 
she had a basis to obtain a protective order.  R. 264, l. 21-23.  Prior to that she had 
no idea that she could successfully obtain a protective order.  R. 265, l. 1.  After 
Michael’s military deployment, he started getting aggressive.  R. 265, l. 20-25.  
Melinda also testified that she did not petition for a protective order earlier 
because she was trying to preserve the parties’ marriage and had to protect the 
children when Michael became increasingly violent.  R. 267, l. 22-25, R. 268, l. 1-
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7.  Melinda does not do some of the Tai Chi motions when she attends those 
classes and wears her hand braces when she participates.  R. 268, l. 5-10.  Melinda 
doesn’t do about 75% of the Taekwondo workout with her children, does not do 
punching, and only participated in this activity to be with her children.  R. 268, l. 
16-25; p. R. 269, l. 1-13.   
 Michael testified as follow during his direct examination.  After Melinda’s 
traumatic brain injury, Michael observed that Melinda could do minor household 
tasks.  R. 308, l. 8-11.  In public, Michael has only observed Melinda not wearing 
her wrist braces a couple of times.  R. 309, l. 8-10.  Michael had asked the special 
master to direct the parties to exchange their children at a police station because 
Melinda was causing stress to his sister during the exchanges.  R. 310, l. 18-20.  
Melinda argued with a police officer for over an hour that she was able to conduct 
exchanges at Michael’s residence.  R. 312, l. 18-20.  Melinda emailed Michael and 
told him that she was going to do the exchanges at his residence and that she 
would “play his games.”  R. 313, l. 14-22.  Melinda would arrive at Michael’s 
house 10-15 minutes earlier generally for exchanges.  R. 317, l. 18.  Melinda never 
left her vehicle to knock on Michael’s door for exchanges.  R. 318, l. 5-6.  
Melinda told Michael not to videotape her.  R. 318, l. 13-18.  Michael admitted 
that he videotaped Melinda during the exchange which occurred on October 31 
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(where Michael left his residence to videotape Melinda in her car).  R. 318, l. 22-
25.  Melinda arrived about 15 minutes early on that occasion, honked her horn, 
and texted Michael that she was at his residence.  R. 319, l. 18-25.  Rather than 
responding to Melinda’s text, Michael ignored them.  R. 320, l. 1-8.  Honking of a 
car horn is against Michael’s HOA policy.  R. 320, l. 16-25.  Michael had asked 
Melinda to not honk previously, but she has kept doing it.  R. 321, l. 1-4.  Michael 
showed a videotape to the Court which he had taken during the exchange over 
Melinda’s objection (because the evidence had not been presented to the 
Commissioner, and Melinda had no prior notice of the videotape).  The videotape 
indicated that Melinda was not ringing Michael’s doorbell; it was the party’s 16-
year-old daughter while Melinda remained in her car.  R. 329, l. 16-23.  Rather 
than answering the door, Michael put a piece of cotton near the doorbell to mute 
the sound because it had become annoying to him and his young son who was 
waiting to be picked up.  R. 330, l. 1-10.  When Michael finally opened the door, 
his 16-year-old daughter confronted him about videotaping her.  R. 334, l. 6-15.  
Ostensibly due to her annoyance with her father, the 16-year-old daughter flipped 
her father the bird as she walked away from the door.  R. 335, l. 10-11.  Michael 
admitted that his behavior had made his daughter angry.  R. 335, l. 13-14.  
Michael videotaped Melinda and his daughter because Melinda had parked in a 
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location which could not be seen by Michael’s recording video cameras that he 
had installed at his residence, and he wanted to record her.  R. 338, l. 1-3.  Michael 
left his residence to record Melinda and went up to Melinda’s car to video her 
because he was afraid Melinda might make false allegations about him as she had 
done in the past.  R. 338, l. 10-12.  While Michael was videotaping Melinda, she 
took a photo of him doing that.  R. 339, l. 15-17.  Melinda then started videotaping 
Michael and gave her camera to her daughter to continue as she backed her car out 
of a neighbor’s driveway.  R. 339, l. 21-22.  Michael admits that he left his 
residence in violation of the special master’s order to videotape Melinda.  R. 342.  
It is impossible to view Melinda’s face or body language in Michael’s exhibits 2 
and 3 (videotape of incident).  Michael indicated that Melinda “ran off” with the 
parties’ son during soccer practice during his parent-time.  R. 349, l. 3-4.  Michael 
admitted that he brought his phone with him when he went to the soccer practice 
in case he needed it to protect himself against a false accusation made by Melinda.  
R. 349, l. 13-18.  Michael denied all of Melinda’s stalking allegations.  R. 350, l. 
8-25.  Regarding Melinda’s photo of Michael at soccer practice, Michael did not 
intend to threaten Melinda by standing close to her with his camera.  R. 352, l. 23-
25.  Michael was standing close to Melinda because it was 10 minutes after 
parent-time, and he was supposed to pick up his son.  R. 352, l. 16-19.  Michael 
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admitted that Melinda had asked him to stop photographing her and/or 
videotaping her a couple of times, but she never expressed that she was afraid of 
him.  R. 353, l. 8-21.  Initially Michael testified that there was not a restraining 
order in the divorce decree; then upon further questioning by his lawyer, he 
admitted that there was a restraint not to harass each other.  R. 354, l. 14-25, R. 
359, l. 1-6.  Despite leaving his residence to videotape Melinda during an 
exchange, Michael testified that he never has done anything that could be 
construed as harassing her.  R. 359, l. 7-9.  Michael denied slamming the roof to 
Melinda’s car.  R. 356-57.  However, Michael did admit that the police asked him 
to leave the residence during that incident.  R. 357, l. 23-25.  Although not 
remembering Melinda’s allegation regarding pushing her, Michael denied ever 
laying his hands on her.  R. 358, l. 13-25; R. 359, l. 1-7.  Michael denied ever 
shoving one of his daughters into a bannister.  R. 361, l. 20-25.  Michael admitted 
that he has a strained relationship with the daughter who Melinda alleges he 
shoved into a banister (R. 365, l. 9-18), and that daughter testified against him on 
behalf of Melinda in the hearing before Judge Allphin.  R. 362, l. 1-6.  The 
daughter also brought up the incident to him.  R. 366, l. 23-25.  Michael admits 
that this incident with his daughter was detrimental to their relationship, but he 
alleges that she has gotten over it.  R. 366, l. 6-9.  Michael denied that he had 
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surveilled Melinda at soccer practices except one time.  R. 367, l. 8-13.  Michael 
testified that he took the video because Melinda was taking their son’s clothes 
with her.  R. 367, l. 15-25.  Michael admitted that at the dance festival incident, 
Melinda gave her son a hug.  R. 374, l. 24.  Part of the record was the police report 
regarding the incident that he had provided the Commissioner.  Michael then 
stated that Melinda started to walk off with his son, so he called the police.  R. 
374, l. 18.  Michael denied ever touching Melinda during the dance incident.  R. 
374, l. 20-24.  Regarding the Taekwondo incident, Michael admitted that Melinda 
was authorized to be at the activity.  R. 377, l. 22-23.  Michael denied making any 
intimidating gestures toward Melinda while at Taekwondo.  R. 378.  Michael 
admitted that he parked in front of his driveway (which blocked Melinda’s car).  
However, he excused this behavior because his garbage can’s placement prevented 
him from parking anywhere else convenient.  R. 380, l. 24-25.  Michael said he 
would have been willing to move his car if Melinda had asked him to do so.  R. 
382, l. 23-24.  Michael denied photographing woman’s butts.  R. 382, l. 15-19.  He 
then said he didn’t remember doing it.  R. 383, l. 7.  Michael testified that he could 
not remember if Melinda had called him about taking a naked photo of her.  R. 
384, l. 3.  Despite complaining that Melinda had scheduled soccer during his 
parent-time, he admitted that he attended all of the soccer games and practices 
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during his parent-time.  R. 388, l. 17-25.  Based upon a previously undisclosed 
email (objected to by Melinda), Michael alleged that Melinda would sit close to 
him during soccer games, with their 16-year-old daughter sitting in between them.  
R. 389, l. 12-19.  Michael’s exhibit 4 notified Michael that she was going to sit 
close to him at a soccer game “for the sake of the kids.”  R. 392, l. 15-25; R. 393, 
l. 1-6.  Melinda did not appear to be concerned about proximity when she sat close 
to him at soccer games.  R. 393, l. 21-23.  Melinda alerted the Court that Civil 
Rule 108 prohibited the introduction of new evidence unless there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances.  R. 299, l. 21-25; R. 300, l. 1-8, R. 302, l. 15-
25; R. 304, l. 1-3.  The Court then overruled a specific objection and allowed the 
new evidence.  R. 391, l. 6-25.  Melinda did not object to Michael’s exhibit 4 
because the Court had already stated its basis for allowing his first three exhibits. 
 Michael testified on cross-examination as follows.  Melinda requested that 
she come to his residence for exchanges because the special master had ordered 
her to do so.  R. 400, l. 6-7.  The special master order required that the parties 
remain in their residences during exchanges.  R. 401, l. 9-13.  Michael let the 
doorbell ring for 12-15 minutes during the videotaping exchange on October 31 
despite his son asking him if he was going to answer the door.  R. 402, l. 2-16.  
Michael did not know if Melinda had asked her daughter to continuously ring the 
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doorbell.  R. 402, l. 17-21.  Although Michael testified that Melinda was honking 
her horn incessantly, the video evidence he presented (which Michael admitted 
that the video picked up the horn honking), indicated that Melinda only honked 
the horn twice during a 12-15 minute period.  R. 402, l. 22-25, R. 403, l. 1-12.  
Michael testified that he did not know whether Melinda was afraid of him or not 
as she sat in her car waiting for her son to come to her vehicle during the exchange 
on October 31.  R. 404, l. 22.  Michael admitted that he intentionally did not 
follow the special master’s order to remain in his residence during exchanges.  R. 
405, l. 4-10.  Michael admitted that he surveilled Melinda with a video camera 
during this exchange.  R. 405, l. 11-15.  Michael admitted that his daughter told 
him not to videotape her during the exchange.  R. 405, l. 16-18.  Michael admitted 
that he ignored his daughter’s request to stop videotaping her and continued to do 
so.  Tr. R. 406, l. 20-23.  Michael testified that Melinda condones her daughter’s 
behavior without any stated foundation of knowledge.  R. 406, l. 24-25, R. 407, l. 
1-22.  Michael admitted that despite Melinda having the right to be at the 
Taekwondo class, he immediately called the police on her.  R. 411, l. 20-25.  
Michael admitted that in the hearing before Judge Allphin Melinda had stated that 
she was afraid of Michael.  R. 412, l. 11-19.  Michael admitted that Melinda had 
emailed him and said that she would sit close to him at their son’s soccer games if 
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he did not videotape her.  R. 415, l. 12-25, R. 416, l. 1-6.  Michael testified that he 
couldn’t remember if Melinda had asked to sit close to him because of the sake of 
the children.  R. 418, l. 1-6.  Michael admitted that Melinda did not enter his 
residence without permission (where he had been renting), but that the children 
would let her into the house.  R. 418, l. 13-16, 24-25; R. 419, l. 1-6.  When 
confronted with a police report (which had been excluded substantively by the 
judge) whereby Michael told the investigating officer that he had beat the roof of 
Melinda’s car, Michael would not admit that he told the policeman that.  R. 422, l. 
18-25, R. 423-434, l. 1-18.  Michael didn’t know why the police officer did not 
state in a police report that he had not told the officer that Melinda had taken their 
son from him at the dance recital despite calling 911.  R. 434, l. 19-25, R. 435-48, 
l. 1-14.   
 On redirect, Michael testified as follows.  He did not answer the doorbell 
because it was not the precise time for Melinda to pick up their son.  R. 450, l. 10-
13.   
 In rebuttal, Melinda testified as follows.  Melinda asked to sit next to 
Michael at the soccer games to reduce conflict in the best interest of the children.  
R. 450, l. 17-25, R. 455, l. 1-6.  Melinda stated in her police reports that she was 
afraid of Michael.  R. 455, l. 18-22.  Upon Michael’s return from military 
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deployment, he became much more violent and aggressive.  R. 458, l. 16-23.  
Melinda did not instruct her daughter to ring the doorbell incessantly; her daughter 
left the car because she was excited to see her brother.  Melinda called to her to 
come back to the car.  Melinda texted Michael to answer the door because their 
daughter was not wearing a coat, it was cold, and she was shivering. Michael 
ignored the texts.  R. 459, l. 15-25, R. 460, l. 1.  Melinda honked her horn to alert 
her daughter to get back in the car.  R. 460, l. 5.  Melinda was not honking her 
horn incessantly.  R. 460, l. 10-13.  Melinda was frightened of Michael during 
exchanges, but she also was frightened not to follow the court’s orders (R. 464, l. 
1-10).  Melinda did not walk off with her son at the dance recital.  The child 
sought her out because he had been left alone when Michael left to call the police, 
and Melinda left not wanting to create a problem.  R. 467, l. 7-15.  Melinda 
testified that on one occasion Michael came to her house during an exchange, 
started yelling, entered her house unlawfully, and threw things out of his car on to 
Melinda’s lawn (R. 473, l. 17-25, R. 474, l. 1-24).  On another occasion, Michael 
called the police during an exchange and started yelling at her parents about 
custodial interference and entered her home unlawfully – which frightened her.  R. 
478, l. 21-25, R. 479-80, l. 1-25.  Regarding Michael’s allegation that she had 
entered his residence unlawfully, she denied that due to Michael’s threat that he 
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would seek a restraining order against him.  R. 482, l. 1-6.  Michael videotaped her 
at the soccer events.  R. 483, l. 1-18; R. 484, l. 6-13, R. 485, l. 10-17.  Melinda 
told Michael to stop recording her because it was frightening her and the children.  
R. 486, l. 8-21, R. 487, l. 16-24; R. 488, l. 4-16.  Various parents came up to 
Melinda during soccer practices and expressed their concerns about Michael.  R. 
489, l. 11-19.  Her Modest Means attorney recommended that she not testify in the 
Judge Allphin hearing so she didn’t.  R. 490, l. 1-5.  Melinda went to a victim’s 
advocate’s office to try and get help.  R. 492, l. 13-18.  During the soccer photo 
incident when Michael called the police due to his claim of custodial interference, 
the officer told her to contact the victim’s advocate’s office and to get a protective 
order.  R. 494, l. 6-10; R. 495, l. 9-21.  The evidence was relevant to prove 
Melinda’s state of mind of fear.  R. 495, l. 1-4.  Michael lied about not beating the 
roof of the car, and the children were present when he did that.  R. 499, l. 17-25.  
Michael lied about not shoving her down.  R. 501, l. 22-25, R. 502, l. 1-4.  
Regarding the shoving incident of the parties’ daughter into the bannister, Melinda 
saw a bruise on her daughter and described it with particularity.  R. 503, l. 25, p. 
210, l. 1-4.  She also heard Michael swearing and yelling at their daughter during 
this incident.  R. 506, l. 2-4.  Regarding the Taekwondo incident, Michael came 
directly at her and she was frightened.  R. 506, l. 9-16.  When Melinda came out of 
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the closet, Michael was there with his camera aiming it at the door to the closet, 
ostensibly photographing her.  R. 506, l. 22-24, R. 508, l. 10-18.  She had been 
inside the close for about 10-15 minutes.  R. 508, l. 4-8.  During this incident, 
Melinda was mostly annoyed.  R. 508, l. 25, R. 509, l. 1.  Michael’s assertion that 
he could not park his car anywhere else but his driveway during exchanges was 
bogus due to the availability of space on the street.  R. 510, l. 7-24.  Regarding 
Michael photographing her when Melinda was naked, Melinda discovered those 
photos on her computer.  She complained to Michael about it, and he admitted to 
her that he had done that.  R. 511, l. 10-25.   
 Upon re-cross examination, Melinda testified as follows.  Melinda agreed to 
do exchanges at a police station because Michael kept threatening her unless she 
did so.  R. 516, l. 22-25.  The children told Melinda that they did not want to do 
the exchanges at the police station.  R. 516, l. 25.  Michael told Melinda that he 
videotaped her at the soccer events.  R. 518, l. 13-15.   
  B.  MATERIAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. 
 The Court sustained Michael’s objection to Melinda’s introduction of three 
police reports -- which corroborated her testimony about Michael’s violence due 
to an authentication challenge.  R. 80, l. 18.  These documents had been submitted 
to the issuing judge and the Commissioner as exhibits with the petition for a 
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protective order.  Melinda made an offer of proof that since Michael had not 
objected to the police report when she had submitted them to the Commissioner, 
he had waived his objection.  R. 179, l. 19-25; R. 180-81, l. 1-22.  Because of the 
Court’s ruling, Melinda did not try to introduce two other police reports as 
evidence which were part of the court record by way of the commissioner’s 
hearing, although she testified that she had given the police reports to the 
commissioner at the hearing.  R. 96, l. 1-3; R. 98, l. 20-24.  Judge Edwards ruled 
that whether Melinda had submitted the police reports to the Commissioner was 
irrelevant.  R. 99, l. 4-6. 
 Judge Edwards allowed Michael to introduce new, video, text, and email 
evidence at the second hearing – which was never disclosed to Melinda prior to 
the second hearing.  This was prejudicial because, not being on notice of this 
surprise evidence, Melinda did not provide emails which could have supported her 
position or rebutted Michael’s assertions.  Melinda brought up the unfairness of 
the Court’s allowance of this evidence during her closing argument and 
throughout the hearing.  R. 528, l. 15-25, R. 529, l. 1.   
 However, prior to the presentation of Michael’s evidence, Michael admitted 
that Judge Edwards should consider all evidence presented before the 
Commissioner.  R. 138, l. 3-4.  This was an inconsistent position under the 
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principle of equitable estoppel.  Melinda further advised the Court that Rule 108 
and the Day case (discussed infra) only had to do with getting an independent 
ruling, rather than limiting the kind or amount of evidence presented at a Rule 108 
hearing.  R. 139, l. 15-25, R. 140, l. 1-4.   
 C.  CLOSING ARGUMENT 
 During closing argument Melinda, citing to Rule 108, argued that it was 
unfair for Michael to surprise her with new email and video recording evidence in 
a second, evidentiary hearing that occurred 30 days after the first hearing.  Tr. P. 
234, l. 15-25.  Melinda had objected to this evidence earlier on.  R. 160-61.  
During his closing argument, Michael exploited the fact that Melinda did not have 
new, rebuttal documentary evidence to rebut his new evidence.  R. 634, l. 10-17; 
R. 537, l. 2-3; R. 540, l. 1-20, R. 541, l. 1-16, R. 547, l. 13-18, 21.  Michael also 
took an inconsistent position by saying because Melinda had not raised the 
trespassing issue before the Commissioner, he could not do so before the judge – a 
second equitable estoppel claim.  R. 553, l. 25 (when he himself had offered new 
evidence during the second hearing).  During closing argument, Michael alluded 
to a private conversation that the judge had with counsel after the first hearing 
which is not part of the record.  R. 555, l. 9-16.  During her closing argument, 
Melinda moved to allow an email on her phone to be introduced as rebuttal 
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evidence to Michael’s new, email evidence, which had surprised her.  R. 556, l. 
17-24, R. 557, l. 14-25, R. 558, l. 1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25.  The judge denied 
Melinda’s motion. R. 558, l. 8-14. 
  C.  THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS 
 The Court used a form to enter its ruling, and did not make specific, written 
findings, nor ask counsel to prepare written findings of fact.  R. 124-25.  However, 
it did state its oral findings on the record as follows.  The Court found that: (1) the 
parties were cohabitants, R. 569, p. 5; (2) no abuse occurred, R. 569, l. 21-24; (3) 
no assault occurred, R. 570, l. 25; (4) no harassment occurred, R. 571, l. 12; (5) no 
electronic harassment occurred, R. 571, l. 15; (6) voyeurism does not apply 
because married persons do not have an expectation of privacy with each other, R. 
574, l. 5-20; (7) no trespass occurred, R. 576, l. 18; (8) no child abuse occurred, R. 
578, l. 23; (9) no threat of violence occurred, R. 579, l. 3; (10) both parties 
violated court rules, R. 580, l. 15; (11) both parties are in the habit of collecting 
evidence against each other, R. 580, l. 21; (12) Michael did not engage in a course 
of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear, relying on the videos that 
Michael presented in the second hearing, R. 583, l. 1-5, 8; (13) subjectively, 
Melinda did not fear Michael when she went to pick up her children from his 
residence because she did it frequently, R. 583, l. 22-25, 584, l. 1-5; (14) even 
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though Michael violated the special master’s order to remain in his residence, 
because Michael videotaped Melinda in close proximity to his residence, and 
because Melinda slowly backed away with her vehicle (despite wearing braces to 
her hands), she was not frightened, R. 584, 1-25; (15) a reasonable person would 
not have been frightened, R. 585, l. 1; (16) Melinda did not have a vulnerability 
due to her traumatic brain injury, R. 585, l. 16; (17) the Court found dispositive 
that the new email evidence Michael had presented in the second hearing proved 
that Melinda was not afraid of him.  R. 585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 6, R. 588, l. 12-19; 
(18) there was some evidence that Melinda was vulnerable.  R. 522, l. 19-22. 
  D.  DISPOSITION 
 The judge vacated the protective order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Melinda was denied a fair hearing when Judge Edwards bifurcated the 
evidentiary hearing under Civil Rule 108 into two hearings.  During the second 
hearing, Michael presented new, prejudicial evidence by way of a videotape, a 
text, and emails which indicated that Melinda was not afraid of him and had asked 
to sit next to him at their children’s soccer practice if he would not surveil her.  
Although Rule 108(c) allows the Court with discretion to consider new evidence, 
the Court did not find that there had been a substantial change in circumstances 
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since the hearing before the commissioner, over Melinda’s objections.  Secondly, 
this civil rule cannot circumvent due process by allowing new evidence to be 
presented without adequate notice.  The evidentiary hearing was hijacked by 
Michael’s successful attempt to introduce evidence by trickery.  For these reasons 
the verdict should be vacated, and the protective order reinstated as a matter of law 
and policy.   
 Secondly, because the District Court relied exclusively on the new evidence 
to find that Michael’s actions did not cause emotional distress under the 
individualized objective standard, there is no basis to support the Court’s finding 
and dismissal of the protective order if that evidence is disallowed. 
ARGUMENT 
 I.  VIOLATION OF CIVIL RULE 108 AND DUE PROCESS REQUIRES 
     STRIKING PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED MATERIAL 
    EVIDENCE AND VACATING THE VERDICT.   
 
 Civil Rule 108(c) allows a judge to consider evidence which had not been 
presented to a commissioner during a Civil Rule 101 hearing, but only if there has 
been a substantial change in circumstances.  Despite Melinda’s repeated 
objections to the introduction of new evidence, and claiming surprise and 
unfairness throughout the second, evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed Michael 
to introduce materially prejudicial and previously undisclosed evidence and made 
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no finding that there had been a substantial change in circumstances.  Michael 
introduced new email, text, and videotape evidence, which also had never been 
presented to the Commissioner.  Therefore, it is clear that the judge erred in 
allowing Michael’s emails, texts, and videotape to be introduced during the 
second, evidentiary hearing because he never ruled that there had been a 
substantial change in circumstances.  The judge may have considered the evidence 
dispositive because it tended to show that Melinda subjectively was not afraid of 
Michael, and that a reasonable person may not have been afraid of him.  The Court 
used that evidence to make that finding.  R. 585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 1-15, R. 588, l. 
12-19.   
 In Day v. Barnes, 2018 UT App. 143, 427 P.3d 1272, the Court of appeals 
stated that a civil rule should be interpreted based upon its plain language.  Id. at 
1275, P15.  Day also stands for the proposition that in the context of a Rule 108 
objection, the judge must make independent findings on both the evidence and the 
law, and that the rule should be read as a whole.  Id. at 1276, P19.  Day goes on to 
say that Rule 108(b) requires a party to identify exactly what part of the 
proceeding a party is objecting to.  Id.  This language implies that the non-
objecting party must have fair notice as to what evidence or legal principle was 
misapplied by the commissioner so that she can prepare for the evidentiary hearing 
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and/or oral argument if the judge orders either.  Here, Michael’s written objection 
neither mentioned the evidence which he introduced at the second hearing, nor did 
it state how such evidence should apply to the law.  Consequently, the second 
evidentiary hearing was effectively a trial by ambush and was fundamentally 
unfair.  Due process is a second legal principal by which the undisclosed evidence 
should be stricken, and the verdict overturned.  
 Nevertheless, once errors have been identified on appeal, Melinda has the 
additional burden to prove that the errors were not harmless.  Horrell v. Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279, 1282 (UT App. 1996).  An error is not 
harmless if but for the error, the probability of a different outcome is sufficiently 
high so that it undermines the appellate court’s confidence in the outcome.  Id.  
Here, the judge relied heavily on the videotape, text, and email evidence that had 
been introduced during the second part of the evidentiary hearing.  R. 583-86.  
Indeed, this new evidence was the dispositive factor for the judge’s ruling.  R. 
585, l. 21-25, R. 586, l. 1-15, R. 588, l. 12-19.  That is, the judge found that 
Melinda was subjectively not afraid of Michael, because, among other things, and 
according to Michael’s email, she was not afraid to sit close to him with the 
parties’ children at another child’s soccer matches.  The judge also found that such 
evidence indicated that a reasonable person would not have been afraid.  R. 586, l. 
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16-21.  Therefore, the undisclosed, new evidence was without a doubt materially 
prejudicial. 
 Melinda attempted to save the day by scrambling to present new evidence 
during her closing argument.  She hurriedly scanned her phone during the second 
hearing, and discovered a single, rebuttal email after she had just finished 
testifying in rebuttal.  R. 556, l. 17-25; R. 558, l. 1-6.  R. 556, l. 17-24, R. 557, l. 
14-25, R. 558, l. 1-6, R. 564, l. 21-25.  However, when Melinda tried to present 
this single piece of rebuttal evidence to the judge, her motion to do so was denied 
as out of time.  R. 558, l. 8-14.  Thus, Melinda had notified the court that such 
rebuttal evidence existed.  Indeed, Melinda had testified during her rebuttal 
testimony that such rebuttal evidence existed because she stated that there were 
other emails and texts which rebutted Michael’s testimony.  R. 453, l. 24-25; R. 
454-455, l. 1-12.  Those emails and texts could have corroborated her testimony 
that in a public place, with a promise that Michael would not photograph, record, 
or surveil her, a reasonable person’s fear of stalking would be significantly 
mitigated – particularly in the context of a mother who had a motivation to try and 
protect her children from undue stress in a high conflict divorce context.  R. 515; 
R. 518, l. 14.  As stated, Melinda testified during the course of the second hearing 
about other emails sent by Michael to her which could have impeached his 
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testimony about not surveilling Melinda and/or about the extent to which he did 
surveil her, and/or how such surveillance impacted a reasonable person.  R. 485, l. 
10-11; R. 486, l. 14-21.  Furthermore, past stalking events which induced fear 
would have no bearing on the more recent proposal of Melinda to sit close to 
Michael publicly at a soccer match with her children if he promised not to 
continue to surveil her.  Thus, this additional email and text evidence, other 
evidence yet to be thought about and/or produced by Melinda in rebuttal and 
providing counsel with sufficient time to assess and plan his arguments regarding 
the undisclosed evidence could have been dispositive to the judge’s ruling.  
Fundamental fairness certainly required such an opportunity.  Melinda advised the 
Court repeatedly about the unfair prejudice she was experiencing by introducing 
this evidence at the hearing.  R. 472, l. 14, R. 528, l. 20-23.  The Court’s error was 
exacerbated by Michael who referred to the undisclosed emails during his closing 
argument as dispositive evidence, R. 541, l. 11, and then argued that because the 
emails were in existence prior to the second hearing, and because Melinda had 
knowledge of the emails generally, springing them upon her during the second 
hearing was not prejudicial to her.  R. 557, l. 9.  Indeed, it is clear that the judge 
bought Michael’s argument because he used Michael’s identical reasoning in 
dismissing Melinda’s cogent, stalking claim.  R. 585, l. 21-25; R. 586, l. 1-21.  
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Therefore, Civil Rule 108 requires that the undisclosed evidence be stricken, and 
the verdict overturned.  See elaboration of this point infra. 
 Secondly, from a policy perspective, Civil Rule 108 should state that if a 
party wishes to introduce new evidence which had not been presented before the 
commissioner, that party needs to provide notice of his intent to introduce such 
evidence by filing a motion with the court to allow the evidence, and that the 
movant has the burden of proof to show that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances.  Civil Rule 108 does not state any procedure for how such evidence 
should be introduced to the judge.  Without clarity, there is always a chance that a 
party may surreptitiously introduce new evidence before the judge as an 
afterthought, further clogging the appellate court’s docket on appeal as here, and 
rendering the Commissioner hearing virtually meaningless. 
 Additionally, since there is a choice between overturning the verdict 
outright or remanding the case so that Melinda may present rebuttal evidence, 
policy, legal, and equitable considerations require the former option.  That is, 
when a party introduces late filed evidence in the civil context, the proper remedy 
as a matter of law generally is to strike the evidence.  See Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 
UT App. 541, 127 P.3d 1256.  Furthermore, from an equitable perspective, doing 
otherwise would be the equivalent to rewarding Michael’s afterthought approach, 
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and placing a burden on Melinda with having to respond to the undisclosed 
evidence.   
Additionally, like the losing party in Pratt, Michael himself created the 
problem which he now faces.  That is, he had thirty days between the first and 
second hearings – plenty of time to file a motion with the court, or to simply 
provide Melinda with a copy of his new exhibits.  He did neither.  Therefore, there 
are legal, equitable, and policy reasons to simply overturn the verdict. 
 As a consolation prize, the case should be remanded to the judge to at least 
afford Melinda the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. 
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT 
MICHAEL DID NOT CAUSE MELINDA EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
UNDER AN INDIVIDUALIZED OBJECTIVE STANDARD. 
 
In Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, 322 P.3d 728, 735, this Court stated that a 
Court must consider a victim’s vulnerabilities under the emotional distress prong 
of Utah’s protective order statute.  It also held that a victim must prove that the 
victimizer caused a significant amount of psychological suffering in his course of 
conduct to find that the protective order should be issued under the emotional 
distress prong of the statute.  Id. at 738.  
Here, the Court made two findings related to fear and emotional distress 
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under the individualized objective standard articulated in Baird which indicate 
that the Court’s ruling is clearly erroneous.  First, the Court concluded that 
Michael’s course of conduct amounted to stalking generally.  R. 581, l. 21-25; R. 
582, l. 1-10.  The Court then inferred that because Melinda slowly backed out of 
Michael’s driveway while he came close to her car to videotape her in violation of 
the special master’s order during a parent-time exchange, Melinda, under the 
individualized objective standard set forth in Baird was not afraid to be in 
Michael’s presence.  R. 584, l. 5-13; R 587, l. 12-22.  However, Melinda testified 
that she went to Michael’s residence as required by court order to pick up her 
children.  A parent should not be denied a protective order simply because she is 
trying to enjoy a fundamental liberty interest.  The Court also failed to consider 
how Melinda’s traumatic brain injury and hand braces may have prevented her 
from fleeing the scene quickly.  For example, it is clear that the Court failed to 
consider how Michael’s  disobedience of the special master’s order to remain in 
his residence impacted a stalked, disabled individual – particularly when the 
victim thought it important to obey the court order as Melinda did, and how it 
would create fear when Michael did not obey the order.  R. 460, l. 8; R. 522, l. 21.  
Also, despite finding some evidence that Melinda was vulnerable, the Court failed 
to connect that vulnerability with the evidence.  R. 522, l. 18-22.   
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Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the only evidence that the 
Court used under the emotional distress prong of the protective order statute was 
the undisclosed emails indicating that Melinda would “play Michael’s games,” and 
sit close to him at public soccer matches if he would not stalk her.  R. 585, l. 21-
25; R. 586, l. 1-21.  If this Court throws that evidence out, then there is no 
evidence to support the Court’s finding on the emotional distress prong of the 
statute.  This seems particularly appropriate because when Melinda asked for 
clarification as to the Court’s ruling after it had entered its findings, the Court, in 
citing to Baird, omitted the part of that opinion which states that a Court must 
consider the particular vulnerabilities of the victim.  R. 587, l. 12-22.  Therefore, 
since the Court found that stalking occurred, the protective order should be 
reinstated on the remaining evidence and findings, even in the light most favorable 
to Michael on the emotional distress prong and if the new evidence is stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
 Civil Rule 108 and fundamental fairness require that the order in this case 
be vacated.  The protective order should be reinstated.  Alternatively, the case 
should be remanded so that Melinda may have a fair opportunity to present 
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